Deck
Wix.com runs a Tel Aviv-based cloud platform that converts a 304M-user freemium website-builder funnel into ~6.1M premium subscriptions and a payments take-rate on $14.3B of merchant volume.
FCF margin guided from 28.8% to high-teens — investment lag, or the new run-rate?
- The machine that was. FY2025 free cash flow $574M on $1.99B revenue — a 28.8% margin, the highest in company history and among the best in its public SaaS peer set (GoDaddy ran 31.8%). Every bull comp anchors on that number.
- The reset that came. Q1 2026 FCF margin fell to 21% from 30% the year before; GAAP operating margin swung from +9.0% in Q2-25 to -12.9% in Q1-26. Management then guided FY26 to high-teens FCF margin post-tender — an 800-1,000 bp compression by their own number.
- The date that decides it. Q2 2026 prints around August 5. TTM FCF margin above 22% on a stable opex ratio would be consistent with investment lag; at or below 15% would be consistent with a structural reset. Both sides have named this print as their resolution trigger.
Management retired 30% of shares at $92 — six weeks before the stock printed $53.
Funded with a $500M revolver, $1.15B of 2030 convertibles, and an externally-confirmed ~$250M PIPE from Durable Capital at a 5% discount (warrant strike of $104.73 referenced by Sherlock/specialist work but not externally confirmed) — equity sold at a discount in the same window the company bought stock back at a ~71% premium to today's $53.70. Three plaintiff firms opened pre-litigation investigations the week after the May 13 print. The action ages well if FY2026 FCF clears roughly $400M; below $350M, the capital structure is the constraint that matters.
Wix's own 20-F now names seven AI-native rivals — and Base44 proved the editor barrier collapses in twelve months.
- The first frontier shoe dropped. A major frontier-model vendor shipped a free AI-native website builder in mid-April 2026; the stock fell 31% the launch week. The 2025 20-F lists seven AI-native builders as Base44 competitors — the threat is now named in the filings, not just the bear deck.
- The Base44 paradox. Wix's own acquired AI app builder went from zero to $150M ARR in twelve months, off a six-month-old single-founder startup bought for $80M cash + $115M earn-out. Bulls call that owning the AI-native winner; the variant read is that it is empirical proof a 19-year editor moat now takes a year to replicate by anyone with subsidized compute.
- Operating data still works — for now. CMS share +33% YoY per W3Techs (March 2026), net revenue retention 105%, payments take-rate climbing from 1.5% to 1.7% over two years. The freemium funnel holds until a frontier-model owner pairs free generation with integrated payments.
Cheapest in the public peer set on every cash multiple, despite the highest FCF margin.
GoDaddy is the cleanest comp — same SMB website-builder model, comparable low-teens growth, near-identical FCF margin (31.8%). It trades at 2.4× Wix's EV/Revenue and 2.3× Wix's P/E. Either GoDaddy is wrong, or Wix is being priced for AI commoditization that has not yet shown up in the operating data. The balance-sheet cushion the tender consumed was what would have absorbed a wrong answer.
The bull's '5.6× forward FCF/share' and the bear's 'high-teens FCF' reference the same flattered cash number.
- Strip the stock-based comp. SBC ran $237M in FY25 — 11.9% of revenue and 4.4× GAAP net income. SBC-adjusted FCF is $337M, a 16.9% margin, not 28.8%. Treasury-stock recycling absorbs the dilution at variable cost, but the gap to peer non-GAAP definitions is real.
- Strip the earn-out lift. FY25 operating cash flow was lifted by a $156M increase in accrued/prepaid/other current liabilities (vs +$12M in FY24) — largely Base44 contingent-consideration cycled from R&D back into CFO ($114M of acquisition-related expense flowed through R&D). The $583M operating cash flow understates how much of FY25's headline conversion was acquisition-accrual mechanics rather than recurring engine power.
- What the GAAP line really says. FY25 GAAP net income of $51M was almost entirely a one-time $51M deferred-tax-asset release; pre-tax GAAP income was $1.1M. The 'earned the cost of capital' milestone is more a tax-timing event than an operating one.
Watchlist — operating data still works, but management's own guide confirms a structural reset on a now-levered balance sheet.
- For. Per-share denominator math: 24% fewer shares after the tender, $9.50+ forward FCF/share even on bearish FY26 guide — 5.6× forward FCF/share on a 33%-YoY CMS-share gainer is a multiple normally reserved for melting businesses, not Rule-of-40 ones.
- For. Base44 is real AI ARR the EV gives zero credit for: zero to $150M ARR in twelve months, two-thirds of core Wix's new-user volume, distributed through a 304M-user funnel and an embedded payments stack rivals do not have.
- Against. Trust discount under-applied: the Premium-subs disclosure was retired in the same year the metric turned negative; the Partners 'hyper-growth' narrative was reframed late; a ~$250M PIPE was sold at a 5% discount the same week management filed the tender at $92 — three episodes of the same late-acknowledgement pattern.
- Against. The freemium funnel is now an unresolved long-term variable, not a moat. If a second frontier-model owner ships free AI generation with integrated payments before year-end, the editor advantage that funded 19 years of compounding becomes a 12-month commodity — and the Israeli cost wedge alone supports a value multiple, not a compounder's.
Watchlist to re-rate: Q2 2026 TTM FCF margin (≥22% is consistent with the cash-compounder frame; ≤15% with a structural reset). Base44 ARR slope through year-end 2026 (≥$250M would validate the second engine). Any free AI website builder shipping with integrated payments from a frontier-model owner (structurally bearish regardless of Wix's own metrics).