Deck

Wix.com · WIX · NASDAQ

Wix.com runs a Tel Aviv-based cloud platform that converts a 304M-user freemium website-builder funnel into ~6.1M premium subscriptions and a payments take-rate on $14.3B of merchant volume.

$53.70
Price
$2.25B
Market cap
$2.06B
Revenue (TTM)
304M
Registered users
Listed on NASDAQ in November 2013; peaked at $353 in February 2021; now $53.70 — an 85% drawdown from the high.
2 · The tension

FCF margin guided from 28.8% to high-teens — investment lag, or the new run-rate?

  • The machine that was. FY2025 free cash flow $574M on $1.99B revenue — a 28.8% margin, the highest in company history and among the best in its public SaaS peer set (GoDaddy ran 31.8%). Every bull comp anchors on that number.
  • The reset that came. Q1 2026 FCF margin fell to 21% from 30% the year before; GAAP operating margin swung from +9.0% in Q2-25 to -12.9% in Q1-26. Management then guided FY26 to high-teens FCF margin post-tender — an 800-1,000 bp compression by their own number.
  • The date that decides it. Q2 2026 prints around August 5. TTM FCF margin above 22% on a stable opex ratio would be consistent with investment lag; at or below 15% would be consistent with a structural reset. Both sides have named this print as their resolution trigger.
The cash-compounder narrative was reset by management's own guide. August decides whether high-teens is the floor or the ceiling.
3 · The capital action that broke trust

Management retired 30% of shares at $92 — six weeks before the stock printed $53.

$1.6B
Dutch tender April 3, 2026
17.6M
shares retired at $92 each
~$700M
mark-to-market loss on tendered shares
$1.0B
Net debt post-tender from $533M net cash

Funded with a $500M revolver, $1.15B of 2030 convertibles, and an externally-confirmed ~$250M PIPE from Durable Capital at a 5% discount (warrant strike of $104.73 referenced by Sherlock/specialist work but not externally confirmed) — equity sold at a discount in the same window the company bought stock back at a ~71% premium to today's $53.70. Three plaintiff firms opened pre-litigation investigations the week after the May 13 print. The action ages well if FY2026 FCF clears roughly $400M; below $350M, the capital structure is the constraint that matters.

4 · The structural fear

Wix's own 20-F now names seven AI-native rivals — and Base44 proved the editor barrier collapses in twelve months.

  • The first frontier shoe dropped. A major frontier-model vendor shipped a free AI-native website builder in mid-April 2026; the stock fell 31% the launch week. The 2025 20-F lists seven AI-native builders as Base44 competitors — the threat is now named in the filings, not just the bear deck.
  • The Base44 paradox. Wix's own acquired AI app builder went from zero to $150M ARR in twelve months, off a six-month-old single-founder startup bought for $80M cash + $115M earn-out. Bulls call that owning the AI-native winner; the variant read is that it is empirical proof a 19-year editor moat now takes a year to replicate by anyone with subsidized compute.
  • Operating data still works — for now. CMS share +33% YoY per W3Techs (March 2026), net revenue retention 105%, payments take-rate climbing from 1.5% to 1.7% over two years. The freemium funnel holds until a frontier-model owner pairs free generation with integrated payments.
5 · The peer-discount anomaly

Cheapest in the public peer set on every cash multiple, despite the highest FCF margin.

1.6×
EV / Revenue GoDaddy 3.9×, sector 6.0×
8.3×
Trailing P/E non-GAAP sector median 26×
5.6×
P / forward FCF/share on management's own guide
42.0
Rule of 40 (FY25) 13.2% growth + 28.8% FCF

GoDaddy is the cleanest comp — same SMB website-builder model, comparable low-teens growth, near-identical FCF margin (31.8%). It trades at 2.4× Wix's EV/Revenue and 2.3× Wix's P/E. Either GoDaddy is wrong, or Wix is being priced for AI commoditization that has not yet shown up in the operating data. The balance-sheet cushion the tender consumed was what would have absorbed a wrong answer.

6 · What both sides are anchored on

The bull's '5.6× forward FCF/share' and the bear's 'high-teens FCF' reference the same flattered cash number.

  • Strip the stock-based comp. SBC ran $237M in FY25 — 11.9% of revenue and 4.4× GAAP net income. SBC-adjusted FCF is $337M, a 16.9% margin, not 28.8%. Treasury-stock recycling absorbs the dilution at variable cost, but the gap to peer non-GAAP definitions is real.
  • Strip the earn-out lift. FY25 operating cash flow was lifted by a $156M increase in accrued/prepaid/other current liabilities (vs +$12M in FY24) — largely Base44 contingent-consideration cycled from R&D back into CFO ($114M of acquisition-related expense flowed through R&D). The $583M operating cash flow understates how much of FY25's headline conversion was acquisition-accrual mechanics rather than recurring engine power.
  • What the GAAP line really says. FY25 GAAP net income of $51M was almost entirely a one-time $51M deferred-tax-asset release; pre-tax GAAP income was $1.1M. The 'earned the cost of capital' milestone is more a tax-timing event than an operating one.
On owner earnings, Wix is fair-to-rich versus GoDaddy, not a 60% discount. The asymmetry both sides describe is partly an artifact of which non-GAAP definition you accept.
7 · Bull & Bear

Watchlist — operating data still works, but management's own guide confirms a structural reset on a now-levered balance sheet.

  • For. Per-share denominator math: 24% fewer shares after the tender, $9.50+ forward FCF/share even on bearish FY26 guide — 5.6× forward FCF/share on a 33%-YoY CMS-share gainer is a multiple normally reserved for melting businesses, not Rule-of-40 ones.
  • For. Base44 is real AI ARR the EV gives zero credit for: zero to $150M ARR in twelve months, two-thirds of core Wix's new-user volume, distributed through a 304M-user funnel and an embedded payments stack rivals do not have.
  • Against. Trust discount under-applied: the Premium-subs disclosure was retired in the same year the metric turned negative; the Partners 'hyper-growth' narrative was reframed late; a ~$250M PIPE was sold at a 5% discount the same week management filed the tender at $92 — three episodes of the same late-acknowledgement pattern.
  • Against. The freemium funnel is now an unresolved long-term variable, not a moat. If a second frontier-model owner ships free AI generation with integrated payments before year-end, the editor advantage that funded 19 years of compounding becomes a 12-month commodity — and the Israeli cost wedge alone supports a value multiple, not a compounder's.
View — watchlist. The setup is binary on the Q2 print (bear -44%, bull +105%, base +30%); positioning before that read carries no edge over waiting one quarter.

Watchlist to re-rate: Q2 2026 TTM FCF margin (≥22% is consistent with the cash-compounder frame; ≤15% with a structural reset). Base44 ARR slope through year-end 2026 (≥$250M would validate the second engine). Any free AI website builder shipping with integrated payments from a frontier-model owner (structurally bearish regardless of Wix's own metrics).